Effective arguing
My dissertation taught me two incredibly eye opening things that I want to remember for the future. Funnily enough, both of these two findings had absolutely nothing to do with the actual topic I was writing about.
"Is it worth going to study at University aged 18 when students finish with so much debt?" This was a seriously popular topic within my social circle, so I studied the pros and cons and wrote my Final Year Dissertation paper on it. Seemed like the smart and sensible thing to do at the time.
"Is it worth going to study at University aged 18 when students finish with so much debt?" This was a seriously popular topic within my social circle, so I studied the pros and cons and wrote my Final Year Dissertation paper on it. Seemed like the smart and sensible thing to do at the time.
It took me a long time to research and write, and I am proud of the finished product (in fact, as a 2 for 1 offer, I'll paste the Abstract and Introduction under this post because it is a real shame that the energy and effort put in to this dissertation will have 0 impact now that University is over!).
However, once I finished, I reread the formalised version of what started with just my personal opinion, and I learned two things that I wasn't very proud of:
However, once I finished, I reread the formalised version of what started with just my personal opinion, and I learned two things that I wasn't very proud of:
1) The initial message I wanted to portray had been watered down by all the frill and long words I had added in to try make me sound more knowledgeable.
2) The conclusion of all the formalised works I quoted to 'back me up' was actually the complete opposite of what I originally felt.
2) The conclusion of all the formalised works I quoted to 'back me up' was actually the complete opposite of what I originally felt.
So there it is. My real-life lessons about arguing my point that I learned from completing a dissertation: when I want to communicate my opinion effectively without losing my initial intended message, just say it how it is. The more frills and justification I use, the weaker the message I portray.
The
social consequences of the decision to withdraw government funding toward
Higher Education in England.
Highlighting the limitations of each theory,
this paper studies the potential consequences of the withdrawal, by the
Coalition government, of funding for
Higher Education in England. Written after the Browne Report was published in
2010, this decision has been the subject of much debate affecting millions of
people across the country. In this paper I find that the reasons for these
decisions can in fact be justified, and furthermore have a potential benefit to society which far outweighs that of previous
policies attempting to deal with this issue. Theoretically, the new policy can
be described as having its roots in
a mixed Mill-Rawls theory. Assessing why these two highly regarded theories of
justice fail when applied to the issue of fair provision of Higher Education as
individual theories, it recommends ways in which shortfalls identified in the
new proposals can be corrected.
Introduction
Having proposed to withdraw £2.9 billion of
public investment in Higher Education (HE) in England annually until 2015 to
reduce public sector borrowing requirements and the deficit, the government has
faced uproar by present students, future graduates and parents from across the
country. From riots and silent protests to pleading journalism and hateful
vandalism, the shift in funding away from partial government provision has been
ridiculed by skeptics as being politically motivated and ‘unjust’ to those
affected. While student loans for tuition fees will be offered to all potential
students in an attempt to ensure that no one is exempt through an inability to
pay, problems stem from the risk or relative payoff attached to taking on the
debt.
Given that increased intellect, innovation
and skills are of the most benefit to graduates, it becomes clear to see how HE
is a tool used for improving labour productivity of the future workforce. This
increase in productivity allows for higher relative economic growth, social mobility
and global competitiveness: imperative for maintaining a high quality of life. 45%
of young people currently enter HE and an extra £59billion of output is
estimated to be produced annually as a result. However, in recent times, the prosperity of these benefits in England has
recently become eroded by countries such as Japan and Korea whose graduates
proportionality produce a higher financial output- hence undercutting any gains
made in England. The prevention of becoming competitively disadvantaged and having
lower quality standards of living thus becomes the principal incentive for
reinventing the HE system with such urgency.
This paper acknowledges that emotion and
reason - though complementary, and dependent on each other - are different. Chapter
1 attempts to look past the initial reactions over increasing tuition fees and
instead approach the idea from a social welfare standpoint: addressing welfare
economics as reasoning, and comparing theories of justice to analyse which offers
the most plausible logic behind these changes in practise.
Sen (2010, 12) summarised the importance of
such reasoning as being “the rule of intellect” (Akbar as cited by Sen, 2010,
39) by looking at injustice through the illustrative paradox of the ‘children
and a flute’. Bringing this into the context of education, we argue for whom it
may be justified to be given a place at university (assuming there is only one
place). Should it be Anne, the candidate with the highest IQ or A Level grades?
Bob, the student from a low-income family who struggled to attain the minimum
entry requirements? Or Carla, who is passionate about a subject and has already
completed research in the field? A Utilitarian would argue that Anne would
benefit from the highest marginal utility of university education; hence the
one available place should be given to her to increase the average utility of
society. Conversely Liberal Egalitarians would be in favour of Bob, arguing
that in order to bring society closer to total equality those who are worse off
should be made as better off as possible. Libertarian thinkers sympathise with
Carla, arguing that she has the right to HE as it is an extension of her being.
After comparing such motives of different ethical
theories of justice such as those mentioned above, I have found John Stuart Mill’s
Utilitarian ideal of maximising the arithmetic mean of utility to ensure
society is made the best off, and John Rawls’ Liberal Egalitarian ideal based
on improve fairness in distribution by maximising the utility of those least
well off in society, to be the most applicable specifically in pertaining to sustainable
provision of HE in terms of society’s collective utility (whereby utility is
assumed to be the measure of an individual’s happiness). Neither of these two theories
comes without its limitations, as found when using basic examples to test the
differences in motives and outcomes of a government following Mill’s approach as
assessed in Chapter 2 nor Rawls’ in Chapter 3. Where Mill succeeds in setting
policies that theoretically improve total welfare it comes with the opportunity
cost of the happiness of those already experiencing low quality of living,
which I believe is neither ethically nor economically favourable. Where Rawls
succeeds in setting policies that aid those at the bottom to minimise
inequality, he hinders those who happen to be better off. This too does not
solve the problem of eliminating injustice to all those affected by changes because
in practise the regressive nature would outweigh the fairness brought about.
It seems that both theories counteract each
other, as shown by mathematical examples which find opposing outcomes resulting
in numerous failures to meet objectives. Yet they each propose ideas that can
be used to correct the shortcomings of the other. Chapter 4 uses the findings from
the previous two chapters to compare potential consequences with the case of
funding and its direct effect on tuition fees in England. Assuming universities
are non-profit organisations who choose their fees and admission policies in
order to enhance social surplus, it is clear that neither pure Mill nor pure
Rawlsian policies describe those of the Coalition government. Alternatively
they can be described by proposing an intermediate: a mixed Mill-Rawls strategy
which takes into account both the weighted average of total utility and the
weighted average utility of the least advantaged through fairness,
privatisation and information whereby iso-elastic welfare maximisation is the
perfect consequence of any policy. I argue that this can best explain
government behaviour implemented in England, and that it will produce a better
consequence than previous policies.
This paper concludes that the best possible
policy would be brought about by universities responding to the proposed
changes by using private information about students more accurately to
determine optimal fees at a specific degree below their marginal cost to
encourage specialisation, producing the most sustainable prospect for the HE
system.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Yours truly,
TML.
TML.
Comments
Post a Comment